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SENTENCING ANTITRUST FELONS
Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act,' the basic criminal
statute in the federal scheme of antitrust enforcement,2 in 1890, in
response to widespread monopolization of the American economy.
3
Although the Act represents a recognition that monopolization is a
social and economic evil to be avoided, criminal enforcement of the
Act has been lax. Furthermore, the debate over the appropriateness
and deterrent effect of criminal sanctions for violations of economic
regulatory legislation still persists.' This controversy concerns not so
I Sherman Antitrust Act §§ 1-7, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 The other antitrust remedial statutes are the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimi-
nation Act, which provides for a fine of $5,000 and imprisonment for one year for
violations of the section proscribing discrimination in rebates, discounts or advertising
service charges, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970), and the Clayton Act, which provides for a
private treble damage action. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
3 Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966).
The following authors endorse the criminal sanction as a remedy for antitrust
violations: E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949); Ball & Friedman, The Use of
Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View,
17 STAN. L. Rv. 197 (1965); Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal
Antitrust Laws, 45 TEX. L. REv. 1301 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Flynn]; Note,
Antitrust Criminal Sanctions, 3 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROB. 146 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Sanctions]. Others argue that criminal sanctions should not be
imposed when the proscribed conduct is morally neutral, as with antitrust violations.
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kadish]. Still others
criticize the use of criminal sanctions in the antitrust context although acknowledging
that they are the most effective deterrent currently available. See, e.g., Berge, Some
Problems in The Enforcement Of The Antitrust Laws, 38 MICH. L. Rv. 462,470 (1940).
Economists advocate the imposition of monetary penalties through public rather
than private enforcement efforts as the most cost efficient and effective deterrents. See
K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
81-96, 112-38 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ELZINGA & BREIT]; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 221-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as POSNER]. They argue that the criminal penal-
ties currently employed against antitrust violators do not accomplish the basic deter-
rent objective.
The economic theory of criminal behavior assumes that crimes are committed only
when the expected utility of the criminal conduct is greater than the expected utility
of any other activity. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Economists argue that deterrence can be accomplished by
making criminal conduct more costly to the actor than legal pursuits. Id. Thus, the
optimum level of deterrence for antitrust violations is achieved by imposing upon the
violator a cost (fine) at least equal to the cost his activity imposes upon society.
POSNER, supra at 221. Compensation for the victims of antitrust crimes is considered
a subsidiary purpose of punisment while retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation
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much the imposition of criminal fines, 5 but whether violators of the
antitrust laws should be imprisoned.'
of the defendant, commonly mentioned by legal scholars as justifications for the impo-
sition of criminal sanctions, are ignored. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 106
(1973) [hereinafter cited as FRANKEL]; Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges:
Draft Cases-1972, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 597, 599-600 (1973).
Even assuming that the social cost of an antitrust violation is calculable with
reasonable accuracy, see POSNER, supra at 224, still other factors must be considered
in determining the appropriate level of monetary penalty. If the probability of discov-
ery and conviction of an antitrust offense is less than 100 per cent, the potential
violator will discount the punishment cost by the probability that the punishment will
ever be imposed. Thus, if the social cost of a particular antitrust violation is $1 million
and the probability of being caught is .25, the potential violator will multiply the social
cost by that probability to calculate his anticipated punishment cost of $250,000. Id.
at 223-24. If anticipated profits for the violation are greater than this amount, the
antitrust violation will be committed. Therefore, the social cost must be divided by
the probability of punishment to arrive at the optimal level of fines; in this case $4
million. Id. at 224. The above example assumes, however, that all potential violators
are indifferent to risk and have no preference between the certainty of a small punish-
ment and the slight probability of a severe punishment. Assuming that potential
antitrust violators may be either risk avoiders or risk preferrers, see ELZINGA & BRarr,
supra at 120, an additional factor must be considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the level of penalty and the certainty of its imposition that will achieve
optimum deterrence. The deterrent effect of the certainty of punishment will vary
according to the violator's risk preference, so that a risk avoider will prefer the cer-
tainty of a small punishment and will engage in more antitrust violations when proba-
bility of detection is high but the expected punishment cost is low. Id. The risk prefer-
rer, on the other hand, will expect greater utility from his violations when the chance
of punishment is small but the penalty high. Id. The degree of deterrence accomplished
by any given level of penalty is, therefore, dependent upon both the probability that
the punishment will be imposed and the attitudes of potential violators toward risk.
Cf. Antunes & Hunt, The Deterrent Impact of Criminal Sanctions: Some Implications
for Criminal Justice Policy, 51 J. URBaN L. 145 (1973) (authors studied only the FBI
Index crimes).
This cost-benefit theory of punishment need not be monetary and is capable of
expression in terms of a prison sentence. Nonetheless, there exists substantial opposi-
ti6n to incarceration as a sanction for antitrust crimes. See ELZINGA & BRarr, supra at
123; POSNER, supra at 225; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 401, 438 (1958). Imprisoning antitrust criminals imposes a cost upon society and
consumes real resources, while the collection of a fine is, in essence, merely a costless
transfer payment. POSNER, supra at 225. Further, it is difficult to translate the cost to
society of a particular violation into a nonpecuniary value-so many days in jail. Id.
Thus, the monetary penalty, when restructured to allow all of the social costs of the
anti-competitive conduct to be transferred to the violator, is arguably the most effi-
cient sanction.
I See Flynn, supra note 4, at 1307 n. 41 where the author noted that in 90% of the
criminal cases between 1890 and 1959 the only remedy imposed upon the convicted
individuals and their corporations was a criminal fine, while prison sentences were the
sole remedy in only 1% of the cases. Both criminal fines and prison terms were imposed
in the remaining 9% of the cases. Id.
See authorities cited in Flynn, supra note 4, at 1301 n.3.
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Throughout the history of the Sherman Act, violators have re-
ceived relatively mild punishment,7 even in cases involving blatant
per se violations of the Act.8 The imposition of a prison sentence was
an exceptional punishment,9 employed as a sanction in fewer than
four percent of the Justice Department's criminal prosecutions in the
period 1890-1969.'0 Not until the Electrical Equipment Conspiracy
cases of 1960" were jail sentences imposed upon upper level execu-
tives of a widely held corporation'2 absent evidence of economic rack-
eteering. Although recent data indicate an increase in the frequency
of prison sentences,' 3 there is nothing to indicate that judicial reluct-
7 Id. at 1305; see also Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate
Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 285-87 (1961) [here-
inafter cited as Community Control.]
1 The Supreme Court has concluded that certain agreements and practices are per
se violations of the Sherman Act "because of their pernicious effect on competition,"
Northern Pac. R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). Such agreements or practices
are presumed unreasonable and, therefore, violative of the Act without extensive in-
quiry into their actual effect on competition. Id. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF ANTTRUST LAW at 165-86 (1976). The following are established "per se" violations
of the Sherman Act: price fixing, United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (19,40); division of markets, United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
group boycotts, Fashion Originators Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); tying
arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
' Prison terms generally were reserved for labor leaders and businessmen who
employed threats or violence in conjunction with an antitrust violation. Community
Control, supra note 7, at 291. Interestingly, antitrust violators receive significantly
more lenient sentences than other types of white collar offenders. See Statement of
Donald I. Baker Before The Tenth New England Antitrust Conference Concerning the
Sentencing of Antitrust Felons, Nov. 20, 1976, reprinted in ANITusT & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 790, D-1 (1976).
,1 Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 12 J.L. &. EcoN. 365, 389
(1970).
" See generally, C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES (1973).
'2 Prior to the electrical equipment cases, prison sentences had been imposed
primarily on the executives and officers of small, closely-held corporations in which
management responsibilities were concentrated in a few individuals. See Flynn, supra
note 4, at 1305. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the difficulty of
determining guilt above the level of those who overtly carry out the conspiracy. In large
corporations, upper level management is able to insulate itself from criminal liability
by claiming ignorance of the conduct of subordinates. See ELZINGA & BRI', supra note
4, at 38; text accompanying notes 78-81 infra. See also United States v. McDonough
Co. [19591 Trade Cas. 69,482 (S.D. Ohio).
'3 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 32. Professor Posner's statistics indicate that prison
sentences were imposed in only eight cases in the nineteen year period 1950-1969, while
sentences of imprisonment were imposed in six cases in the four year period 1970-1974.
Id. at 33. In 1975, twelve individuals were sentenced to prison in six separate cases.
See Dept. of Justice Sentencing Memorandum in the Case of United States v. Alton
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ance to incarcerate antitrust criminals has been overcome."
This judicial reluctance to sentence antitrust violators to prison
or to impose the maximum allowable fine presumably has rested on
a belief that conviction of the crime itself constituted sufficient pun-
ishment to the white collar criminal, often a respected member of the
community. 5 Thus, the courts considered that conviction alone de-
Box Board Co., ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 784, D-1, D-3 Appendix
A (1976) [hereinafter cited as Alton Sentencing Memorandum].
11 A similar pattern of leniency is discernible in the imposition of criminal fines
both on individuals and their corporations. Prior to 1955, the maximum fine that could
be imposed upon either a corporation or an individual defendant was $5,000. Sherman
Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). Actual fines levied averaged less than half that
amount. Community Control, supra note 7, at 286. In 1955, Congress amended the
Sherman Act and raised the maximum fine to $50,000, Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 281, 69
Stat. 282 (1955). Nonetheless, the average fine imposed under the amended statute
was considerably less than the maximum allowable. The average corporate fine be-
tween 1955 and 1965 was only $13,420 and individual fines averaged $3,365. Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 233 (1973) (statement of Mark Green).
Even where corporate profits from the illegal activity ran into the millions of
dollars, the statutory maximum fine was rarely imposed. In the Electrical Equipment
Conspiracy cases, for example, see note 11 supra, twenty-nine corporations and forty-
four executives were indicted on charges of bid-rigging and price fixing. The value of
the goods involved in the scheme exceeded one billion dollars. The average corporate
fine imposed in the case was $16,500 and the highest individual fine imposed was
$12,500. The maximum fine of $50,000 was levied only once in 159 sentences. Com-
munity Control, supra note 7, at 287; see Flynn, supra note 4, at 1308 n. 45.
,5 There is a popular notion that, in the professional and social milieu of antitrust
defendants, conviction of a crime results in serious stigmatization of the offender.
Criminal Sanctions, supra note 4 at 152; White Collar Justice, 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
pt. II at 12 (1976). Opponents of this theory contend, however, that inefficiency in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws results from the fact that such offenses are not
perceived by the general public as morally wrong. See Kadish, supra note 4 at 435-38.
If conviction of antitrust crimes results in stigmatization of the offender by his peers,
then the public arguably does attach moral opprobrium to these offenses. Criminal
Sanctions, supra note 4 at 154-55. Additionally, the reclassification of Sherman Act
violations from misdemeanors to felonies indicates that Congress, as representative of
the public generally, considers antitrust violations to be serious crimes. Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No..93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(Supp. V 1975).
One commentator has asserted that:
Those who insist that moral culpability is a necessary element in
crime argue that criminality is lacking in the violations of laws which
have eliminated the stigma from crime. This involves the general
question of the relation of criminal law to the mores. The laws with
which we are here concerned are not arbitrary, as is the regulation that
one must drive on the right side of the street. The Sherman Antitrust
Law, for example, represents a settled tradition in favor of free compe-
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terred future violations and no further punishment was necessary.'"
Moreover, imprisonment of white collar criminals normally was un-
necessary for the protection of society or the rehabilitation of the
offender. 7 Nonetheless, the degree of social stigma which attaches to
conviction of an antitrust violation is insufficient to deter potential
offenders and additional sanctions may be necessary.'
In 1974, Congress responded to the lenient attitudes of the courts
toward the sentencing of white collar criminals 9 by enacting the An-
titrust Procedures and Penalties Act. 0 Section 3 of the bill substan-
tially increased the penalties for violations of the Sherman Act. The
maximum fine was increased from $50,000 to $100,000 for individual
defendants2' and the maximum prison sentence was increased from
one year to three years.22 In addition, violations of the Sherman Act
were reclassified from misdemeanors to felonies.
2 3
Although the legislative history of the bill as it relates to criminal
sanctions is not extensive,2 4 the floor debates in the House of Repre-
tition and free enterprise .... A violation of the antitrust laws is a
violation of strongly entrenched moral sentiments.
E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 45 (1949).
" See White Collar Report, 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) pt. II at 10-11 (1976).
" See United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. EP. (CCH) 61,336
at 71,166 (N.D. 111. 1977). Two of the traditional justifications for imprisonment as a
criminal sanction are the need to incapacitate or isolate the offender for the protection
of society and to rehabilitate the criminal. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 106. While anti-
trust crimes are costly to society, the violating businessman presents no physical threat
to the public. Incapacitation generally is necessary only for those offenders whose
release from confinement would "present a substantial threat to the public safety."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, CH. 2, SENTENCING, reprinted in JUSTIcE AND SENT-
ENCES: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CIRCUITS 224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT]. Further, antitrust felons are not in need of psychi-
atric or any other type of rehabilitation currently available in prison. FRANKEL, supra
note 4, at 90. Cf. United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
61,336 at 71,169 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (court indicated that some antitrust criminals may
be in need of rehabilitative treatment).
'1 See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 4, at 1316-18; Criminal Sanctions, supra note 4, at
154.
" See 120 CONG. REc. H36340 (1974) (Remarks of Rep. Hutchinson).
Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975).
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 Id. For a thorough discussion of the possible consequences of classifying crimes
as felonies rather than as misdemeanors, see generally Project, The Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970).
21 Hearings were held by the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress in
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sentatives illuminate the legislative intent behind increased penal-
ties.' Most of those who spoke on the House floor favored the bill.
Several representatives stressed that the statutory maximum penal-
ties should be increased so that violators need no longer receive small
fines or short prison sentences. 6 The purposes of the penalty increase
were to deter antitrust crimes and to provide punishment commen-
surate with the gravity of the offense.27 Additionally, several speakers
1973 and 1974. However, the bill then considered did not contain the penalty provisions
ultimately enacted. As originally passed by the Senate, see 119 CONG. REC. S24596
(1973), and reported out by the House Judiciary Committee, see Hearings on S.782
Before the Sub-Comm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), the legislation provided for only an in-
crease in fines to $500,000 in the case of corporations and to $100,000 for individual
defendants. Prompted by the President's message to Congress on October 8, 1974, see
120 CONG. REc. H34421 (1974), the House Judiciary Committee reconsidered the bill
and increased the corporate maximum fine to $1,000,000 and reclassified the crime
from a misdemeanor to a felony with a corresponding increase in the maximum prison
term from one year to three years. See 120 CONG. REC. H36339 (1974).
11 120 CONG. REc. H36339 (1974).
28 See, e.g., id. at H36340 (Remarks of Rep. Hutchinson).
27 The following comment is representative of the remarks made by several legisla-
tors emphasizing the important deterrent function of the more severe criminal sanc-
tions:
Corporate executives may now reasonably expect that they will not
receive any meaningful punishment for criminal violations of the
Sherman Act even when they commit the most serious of price-fixing
offenses. In this time of double-digit inflation, the public cannot af-
ford to let giant corporations commit repeated violations of the anti-
trust laws. Today we should and must amend those laws to make the
penalties for antitrust violations strong enough to act as a real deter-
rent.
Remarks of Rep. Heinz, id. at H36341.
The administration shared a similar interpretation of the statute. The President
noted that the increase in penalties was long overdue and that the bill would provide
a significant deterrent "and will give the courts sufficient flexibility to impose mean-
ingful sanctions." Statement of the President on Signing the Bill Into Law, 10 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1600 (Dec. 23, 1974).
Only Representative Danielson argued that the increased penalties would not be
an effective deterrent. He suggested that monetary penalties against corporations,
designed to deprive them of all profits accruing as a result of the violation, see note 4
supra, and civil sanctions against individuals barring them from employment as execu-
tives for a period of five years would have a more substantial deterrent effect. 120
CONG. REc. H36345 (1974). Some concern was expressed over the possibility that,
because of the vagueness of the Sherman Act provisions, businessmen might be con-
victed of a felony and subject to serious punishment for conduct which previously had
not been considered criminal. This point was not seriously debated, 120 CoNG. REC.
S38586 (1974) (Remarks of Sen. Hruska), however, and probably is not an important
concern in view of the longstanding Justice Department policy to bring criminal
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emphasized the importance of impressing upon the public the seri-
ousness and costliness of antitrust crimes in order to dispel the popu-
lar notion that such crimes are merely "technical violations." 8
Despite a clearly expressed congressional desire to increase the
severity of punishments imposed for violations of the Sherman Act,
enactment of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act" does not
assure this result. The ultimate choice of sanction for antitrust
crimes, as well as for other federal crimes," remains with the sentenc-
ing judge. Judicial discretion in the matter of sentencing is limited
only by the statutory maximum penalty,3 ' and is reviewable only for
serious abuse of, or failure to exercise, discretion.12 Further, because
Congress has failed to codify any statement of the goals and purposes
that properly may be served through the sentencing process, 3 judges
charges only against those whose conduct amounts to an established per se violation
of the Act. See Flynn, supra note 4 at 1321 n. 106, quoting ATrr' GEN. NAT'L COMM.
ANTITRUST REP. 350 (1955). Moreover, businessmen generally have access to competent
counsel and should be aware that their conduct is criminal. See Criminal Sanctions,
supra note 4, at 149 (1967).
2 Correspondence of Asst. Atty. Gen. W. Vincent Rakestraw, 120 CONG. REc.
H36339 (1974).
" Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975).
The practice of allowing judges nearly complete discretion in assigning sent-
ences is not unique to the federal system. Most state court judges exercise a similar
discretion in applying criminal sanctions. See THE TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT .11-13 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE]; Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons
to Prison, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1334 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Structures].
31 See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); United States v. Flohr, 472
F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1973). See also FRANKEL, supra note 4; Frankel, Lawlessness In
Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 1 (1972); Project, Parole Release Decision-making and
the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 888 (1975); Comment, Discretion In Felony
Sentencing-A Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. L. REv. 857 (1973). The Sher-
man Act is typical of most federal criminal legislation in setting only a maximum and
no minimum penalty. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975). Thus, the decision whether to
fine or to imprison the defendant is within the trial judge's discretion. Likewise, the
judge is free to set the amount of the fine and the length of the prison term at any
level between zero and the statutory maximum prescribed by Congress. See Statutory
Structures, supra note 30 at 1138 n.2.
"' See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Yates v. United States, 356
U.S. 363 (1958); Giblin v. United States, 523 F.2d 42 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v.
Dubley, 436 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir.
1960); FRA&KEL, supra note 4, at 75-76.
3 FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 106-07. In an effort to remedy the problem of unguided
judicial discretion, Senator Kennedy has recently introduced legislation that would
establish sentencing goals and criteria to be applied by federal judges, a sentencing
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have been left free to select these objectives largely on the basis of
personal preference. 4 Despite the absence of a congressional state-
ment concerning sentencing objectives for the general run of federal
crimes, the legislative history of the Antitrust Procedures and Penal-
ties Act makes explicit at least two goals that Congress hoped to
achieve through sentencing in antitrust cases: punishment and de-
terrence. 5 Unless individual judges ignore this expression of congres-
sional intent, further disagreement over sentencing objectives in anti-
trust cases seems unlikely.
Nonetheless, the congressional expression of sentencing objectives
does not restrict judicial discretion in determining what level of sen-
tence within the statutory limits, will best accomplish these objec-
tives. The antitrust laws, like most other federal criminal statutes,
merely set an upper limit on the severity of punishment" without
indicating in what sort of case this penalty, rather than some lesser
one, should be imposed. Since the courts receive little or no legislative
guidance on the question of what factors generally should be con-
sidered in aggravation or mitigation of sentence,3 the potential for
sentencing disparity remains. While there are some commonly agreed
upon factors, such as record of prior offenses and violence as a cir-
cumstance of the crime's commission," courts are not obligated to
consider any specific factors, nor are they given any guidance as to
what effect the presence or absence of certain factors should have
upon the sentence. Other variables, such as guilty pleas, may re-
quire special consideration in the determination of a proper sen-
tence. 0 Some judges feel that a defendant who has pleaded guilty
has benefitted the government by saving the expense of a trial and
that this should be considered in mitigation of sentence.4' Other
judges disagree, 2 but all are free to follow their personal inclinations
commission to promulgate specific sentencing guidelines, and procedures for appellate
review of sentences. 123 CONG. REc. S405 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977).
31 Id.
3 See note 27 supra.
3' See note 31 supra.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 1,5 (1972).
" TASK FORCE, supra note 30, at 42.
3' Id. at 20. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force recommended that legisla-
tures define which factors may be considered by a sentencing judge in aggravation or
mitigation of sentence. The court would then be permitted a limited discretion to raise
or lower a sentence within a narrowly defined range based on the presence of these
factors. Id. at 20-21.
4' Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 1,5 (1972).
" Id. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 684 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
" See, e.g., United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1,3-4 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant
may not be given a longer prison sentence because he chose to exercise his Sixth
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on the subject. 3 Thus, individual sentencing decisions are the prod-
ucts of divergent judicial discretion, loosely guided by the legislative
determination of the appropriate maximum penalty.
The result of this broad discretion generally has been a wide dis-
parity in the sentences imposed for substantially similar crimes." In
the area of antitrust crimes, the disparity has been less pronounced,
since offenders usually have received fairly mild punishment." The
judge's discretion, however, remains the determinative factor in the
sentencing of antitrust criminals and, with the increase in the statu-
tory maximum penalties, there is a corresponding increase in the
potential for wider disparity among sentences.
Recognizing the importance of judicial discretion in the sentenc-
ing process, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice re-
cently has begun a concerted effort to influence the exercise of that
discretion in the sentencing of antitrust violators. The Justice De-
partment, following the lead of Congress, recommended that prison
sentences for those convicted of per se violations of the Sherman Act
be more severe and imposed more often." In its recently issued sen-
tencing recommendation guidelines, the Justice Department argued
that incarceration is the most effective method of achieving both
specific and general deterrence." Imprisonment accomplishes spe-
Amendment right to a jury trial).
4 See United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1,3-4 (6th Cir. 1975) where the Sixth
Circuit acknowledges that had the trial court chosen not to express its reasons for
assigning the particular sentence the appellate court would have had no basis for
reversing the sentence. See also FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 25.
11 See THE P smaFSm's COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT, supra note 17, at 223;
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE GoALs AND STANDARDS, REPORT
ON CORRECTIONS 146 (1973); Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft
Cases-1972, 42 U. CINN. L. Rv. 597 (1973).
Is See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra.
11 See Justice Department Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Donald
I. Baker to all attorneys and economists of the Antitrust Division, Feb. 24, 1977,
Guidelines for Sentencing Recommendations In Felony Cases Under the Sherman Act,
reprinted in ANTIrmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 803, F-1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Sentencing Guidelines]. The Department justified its recommendation for
stiffer penalties by noting that Congress increased not only the maximum fine but also
the maximum prison penalty for Sherman Act violations, indicating a legislative judg-
ment that imprisonment should play an important role in punishing antitrust crime.
Id. at F-2. See also, ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 790, AA-1 (1976); United
States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,336 at 71,166 (N.D. Ill.
1977). Congress apparently was convinced that stiffer penalties would deter antitrust
violations. 120 CONG. REc. H35340 (1974).
11 See Alton Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 13, at D-1, D-2; Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-3.
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cific deterrence of convicted antitrust violators by making the pros-
pect of repeated violations unattractive. 8 General deterrence is ac-
complished by making an example of those convicted and imposing
penalties that are severe enough to dissuade others who may be
tempted to violate the antitrust laws. 9
The Department reasoned that when relatively mild fines are the
only penalty imposed for antitrust crimes, businessmen tend to view
the conviction as nothing more than a reasonable license fee to engage
in criminal conduct."0 It concluded that only when the probable pun-
isment for the crime substantially outweighs5' the potential profits
will antitrust violations be deterred.2 Businessmen confronted with
the probability of imprisonment as the penalty for conviction of Sher-
man Act violations likely would attempt to avoid punishment at all
costs,5" and therefore, prison sentences should be a viable deterrent.
" See U.S. v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 61,336 at 71,164
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
11 Some commentators believe that antitrust violations are particularly suscepti-
ble to general deterrence.
Viewed in the large, the characteristic of the conduct typically pro-
scribed by economic regulatory legislation most relevant for the pur-
pose of criminal enforcement is that it is calculated and deliberative
and directed to economic gain. It would appear, therefore, to consti-
tute a classic case for the operation of the deterrent strategy.
Kadish, supra note 4, at 435 (footnote omitted).
50 See Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-1 to F-2.
The phrase "substantially outweighs" is used to indicate that penalties imposed
for antitrust violations must be greater than, and not merely equal to, potential profits
if the appropriate deterrent effect is to be achieved. As Asst. Atty. Gen. Baker recently
noted, "if the probability of getting caught and convicted is low, the punishment will
have to be much greater than criminal revenues to achieve deterrence." Statement of
Donald I. Baker Before the Tenth New England Antitrust Conference Concerning the
Sentencing of Antitrust Felons, Nov. 20, 1976, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 790, D-1, D-3 (1976). See note 4 supra.
52 The profit making potential of criminal pricefixing conspiracies is undeniable.
See M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 170 (1972). For example, the profits
resulting from pricefixing in the Electrical Equipment conspiracy cases were estimated
at $840 million, yet the defendants, both individual and corporate, paid total fines of
only $1,954,000. Id. at 156. See note 14 supra. Generally, the level of criminal fines
imposed in the past on executives and corporations has been less than the gains
realized from their anticompetitive conduct. Criminal Sanctions, supra note 4, at 150.
13 Although it is commonly stated that antitrust violators have a greater abhor-
rence of imprisonment than other criminals, see, e.g., 120 CONG. Rc. H36343 (Re-
marks of.Rep. Seiberling), no evidence of the truth of the proposition is available.
ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 4, at 43.
"' Because corporations are permitted to indemnify their executives, individual
criminal fines have had a minimum deterrent effect. Criminal Sanctions, supra note
4, at 150. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 145(a)-(d)(1975). New York, for example, permits
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The introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines55 recently issued by
the Justice Department indicates that the Department views deter-
rence as the principal objective of criminal sentences for antitrust
violators. Although the selection of goals and purposes to be served
by the sentencing process primarily is a legislative judgment rather
than an administrative or a judicial one,57 Congress has failed to
outline systematically what those objectives should be. 8 Nonetheless,
the Justice Department's emphasis on deterrence in recommending
prison sentences accords with the available evidence of what Con-
gress intended to accomplish by increasing the penalties for Sherman
Act violations. 9 Lacking any explicit legislative sentencing policy for
the broad range of federal crimes, the Justice Department reasonably
chose to adopt what seems to have been the goal that Congress sought
through passage of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act."
Although no sentences have yet been imposed under the felony
statute,' the Justice Department has argued that courts sentencing
under the former misdemeanor statute should be guided by the con-
gressional determination, evidenced by the amendment, that anti-
trust violations constitute serious crimes for which imprisonment is
appropriate . 2 How the courts will respond to the Justice Depart-
a corporation to indemnify its officers for fines and litigation expenses if the executive
has pleaded nolo contendere and if the board of directors finds that he was not
guilty of misconduct. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 17 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270
(S. Ct. 1942). Indemnification is permitted because the executive's plea of nolo conten-
dere benefits the corporation by reducing the likelihood of private treble damage
actions against the corporation by preventing use of the conviction as prima facie evi-
dence in the private civil action. See Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)
(1970). See generally Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official For Fines and
Expenses Resulting From Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 GEO. L.J. 566 (1962).
55 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 803, F-1 (1977).
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-1 to F-2.
7 See text accompanying note 34-36 supra; see also NATIONAL ADvisORY CoMMIs-
SION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE GOALS AND STANDARDS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, 143 (1973).
"' See authorities cited in note 34 supra.
5' Id.
'o See note 27 supra.
, Several defendants, however, have been indicted under the amended statute,
see Interview with Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker, ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 787, AA-2 (1976). Defendants whose illegal conduct occurred
prior to the amendment of the statute "must be tried for, found guilty of, and sen-
tenced within the limitations of the statute as it existed at the time of their viola-
tion of the law." United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH),
61,336 at 71,165 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
"2 See Alton Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 17, at D-1. The government
obviously did not recommend sentences in excess of the then prevailing statutory
maximum penalty. In the case of one defendant, however, the Justice Department did
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ment's sentencing requests is uncertain. In United States v. Alton
Box Board Co., 3 a case involving misdemeanor rather than felony
indictments, the court refused to consider the 1974 amendments in
sentencing executives who pleaded nolo contendere to charges of
price fixing. 4 The Alton court rejected as "highly improper"" the
suggestion that congressional intent in increasing Sherman Act pen-
alties should guide the court's sentencing determination in a case
brought under the former misdemeanor statute." Nonetheless, the
court indicated, in dictum, that under the statute as amended, im-
prisonment will be more frequent 7 and, were it sentencing these de-
recommend the then maximum sentence of one year imprisonment and a $50,000 fine.
ANTIRruST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 806, AA-1 (1977). It was not imposed. Id.
1 5 TRADE REG. RsP. (CCH) 61,336 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The indictment in Alton
Box Board Co. named twenty-three major manufacturers of folding paper cartons and
forty-eight executives of those corporations who had conspired over an extended period
of time to fix prices by a system of cover bidding. Although the defendants had pleaded
nolo contendere and had not been adjudged guilty, the Justice Department contended
that nolo pleas were the equivalent of guilty pleas for sentencing purposes, see notes
42 & 43 supra, and accompanying text, and that the court should not consider the pleas
as entitling these defendants to special consideration. See generally FRANKEL, supra
note 4. The court apparently accepted this argument. There is no indication that the
judge considered the pleas of nolo contendere as mitigating factors in imposing sent-
ence. 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,336 (N.D. Il. 1977).
It has been asserted that uncontrolled acceptance of nolo contendere pleas "has
led to shockingly low sentences and insignificant fines which are no deterrent to
crime." United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (quoting
memo of Atty. General). See Alton Sentencing Memorandum,supra note 17 at D-1;
United States v. McDonough Co., [1959] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 69,482 (S.D. Ohio).
Defendants, both individuals and corporations, commonly plead nolo contendere to
Sherman Act charges. See Flynn, supra note 4, at 1325. The prevalence of nolo pleas
may be explained by a desire to avoid the expense of litigating the charge fully or to
avoid the social stigma that attaches to a plea of guilty. Note, Section 5 of the Clayton
Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea, 75 YALE L.J. 845, 846-47 (1966). Another reason
for such pleas is the advantages offered by the proviso to Section 5 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1970). See note 54 supra. Consideration of nolo pleas in mitigation
of sentence by some courts is a further example of the exercise of sentencing discretion.
See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
61 United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 61,336 at 71,162
(N.D. Ill. 1977).
Id. at 71,165.
" Id. The court originally did impose prison sentences of from five to sixty days
on fifteen of the indicted executives. Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1976, at 4 col. 3. However,
the court later reduced the jail sentences of eight of the defendants and instead im-
posed various terms of "alternative type" sentences. 5 TRADE REG. REP. 61,336 at
71,169-70. These alternative sentences required the defendants to perform public serv-
ices through a program designed to provide employment for ex-convicts. Id. at 71,169-
70 n.9. A table of the total sentences imposed on each of the 48 defendants in the case
may be found appended to the court's opinion. Id. at 71,184-85.
11 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1 61,336 at 71,167.
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fendants under the felony statute, the court "could more easily find
imprisonment indicated in all instances . ... ,1 This conclusion
represents a substantial break with 'past sentencing practice under
the Sherman Act69 although it falls short of assuring success for the
government in obtaining stiff sentences for antitrust felons.
The Justice Department's Sentencing Guidelines7 ° were designed
to structure and to systematize the government's sentencing recom-
mendations in upcoming felony cases. The guidelines provide a policy
for departmental sentencing recommendations that may result in an
overall increase in the level of penalties sought and can insure con-
sistency from case to case.7 ' Although the guidelines are designed for
use by the Justice Department in making sentencing recommenda-
tions, they clearly were drafted for use by the sentencing judge as a
framework for the exercise of judicial discretion.7 1 Use of the guide-
lines will make available to the sentencing judge the government's
expertise and broad perspective in the matter of sentencing.
73
The Department's guidelines recommend a base sentence of 18
months imprisonment.7 4 From this base point, individual sentences
will be computed with regard to the presence or absence of five aggra-
vating factors and three mitigating factors. Sentence recommenda-
tions will be increased above the 18 month base level where the
amount of commerce affected exceeds $50 million.7 5 The government
pointed out that the average sentencing recommendation of 18
months already includes an "amount of commerce" factor generally
found in a typical conspiracy. As the level of commerce affected
0 Id. The court noted, however, that exceptional circumstances, such as ill health,
might indicate a different sentence.
11 See notes 5 & 14 supra.
71 See Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 4 at F-1.
"' Id. at F-1 to F-2.
72 Id. Unless the guidelines are to some extent adopted by the courts, the Justice
Department's goal of having sentences "broadly consistent over time and across the
country" is unattainable. Id. at F-2.
11 Id. at F-2.
7" Eighteen months is one half of the statutory maximum prison term. Id. at F-2
to F-3. The eighteen month base sentence was chosen after taking into account the
parole provisions of Title 18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-66; 4201-10 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
These sections provide for parole release eligibility after a portion of the sentence has
been served, generally one-third for some sentences of from one to three years. 18
U.S.C. § 4202 (1970). Additionally, time off for good behavior may be deducted from
the sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-66 (1970). The Justice Department's guidelines
recommend that the sentencing judge consider the effect of these parole provisions on
the amount of time that will actually be served under any given sentence. Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-2 to F-3.
" Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-3.
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increases above this average figure, the base sentence should be ad-
justed upward by one to six months.7 6 Also, where the individual
defendant serves in an upper echelon position within his corporation
an increase in the base level sentence will be appropriate.7 Here
again, the base level sentence assumes that the defendant is an aver-
age employee and proof otherwise will result in a higher recom-
mended sentence. Moreover, the reluctance of juries to convict and
of judges to imprison individual Sherman Act violators has been
attributed to the fact that it is often difficult to pinpoint guilt above
the level of the overt actor. 8 Judges and juries apparently feel that
the defendants before them often are not the policy formulators who
are responsible for the crime. 9 Considering the defendant's position
in the corporation as an aggravating factor will do little to overcome
this hesitancy. Because upper echelon executives in large, widely-
held corporations are able to insulate themselves from criminal prose-
cution by claiming ignorance of the conduct of subordinates, they are
less likely to be indicted for Sherman Act violations.' Thus, the
impact of considering position in the corporation as a factor aggravat-
ing sentence will continue to be borne generally by the executive of
the small enterprise, where the individual officer is, in effect, the
corporation."
In addition to the above mentioned aggravating factors, the Jus-
tice Department's Sentencing Guidelines suggest an increase in the
base level sentence when the defendant's participation in the conspir-
acy is unusually long,82 when predatory or coercive conduct is em-
ployed in furtherance of the conspiracy,83 and when the defendant
previously has been convicted of other antitrust crimes.84 A previous
conviction is considered the most serious of the aggravating factors
and will result in the recommendation of the maximum three year
16 Id. If the conspiracy is extremely small or localized and the amount of affected
commerce is small, a reduction of sentence may be appropriate. See text accompany-
ing notes 90-92 infra.
7 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-3.
7 See authorities cited note 12 supra.
7' See Community Control, supra note 7, at 292 n.50.
o ELZINGA & BRErr, supra note 4, at 38.
" See authorities cited note 12 supra.
82 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-4. Voluntary withdrawal from a
conspiracy may be considered a factor in mitigation of sentence, although entitled to





prison term. Consideration of past criminal record is commonly re-
cognized as an appropriate factor to be weighed in sentencing deci-
sions" and is properly emphasized by the Justice Department.
Only three factors are to be considered in mitigation of sentence.
First, cooperation with the government may prompt a recommended
sentence that is below the 18 month base level. 6 In view of the limited
investigative and enforcement resources of the Antitrust Division,
encouraging businessmen to report illegal activity to the government
may prove a valuable aid to overall enforcement87 and should be
promoted. Second, personal, family, or business hardship, if proved
by the defendant, may require a reduction in sentence.88 Third, if the
conspiracy is extremely small or localized something less than the
base level sentence may be recommended." To the extent that a
small local conspiracy will affect only a small amount of commerce,
it appropriately may be considered a less serious violation. This
guideline, however, also mentions that the imprisonment of the chief
executive of a small, local firm may have serious consequences for the
business, but there is no apparent reason why this fact may not be
considered under the heading "personal, family, or business hard-
ship." 9 Perhaps the Department intended this hardship factor as a
catchall provision to relieve against the possibility that the executives
of smaller corporations will receive stiff prison sentences while their
counterparts in larger, widely-held corporations will go free.8"
By establishing a base sentencing recommendation, the govern-
ment has taken a valuable first step toward achieving sentencing
uniformity in antitrust cases, a prerequisite to the achievement of
'general deterrence. At a minimum, potential violators must be con-
vinced that if apprehended and' convicted, they will be punished. 2
Further, the base sentence appropriately establishes a punishment
I FRANKEL, supra note 4 at 25; TASK FORCE, supra note 30, at 42-43.
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-4.
See Statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Donald I. Baker Before the Tenth New
England Antitrust Conference Concerning the Sentencing of Antitrust Felons, Nov. 20,
1976, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 790, D-1, D-2 (1976).
1 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 46, at F-5.
" Id.
90 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
" Certainty in the criminal sentencing context refers to knowledge on the part of
potential violators that conviction of antitrust crimes is followed by certain penal
consequences. Moreover, the deterrent impact of any given penalty is also dependent
on the certainty with which apprehension and conviction will follow a violation. See
note 4 supra. Given the level of Justice Department enforcement funding, however,
only the former type of certainty appears reasonably achieveable.
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for the average antitrust violator while the aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors allow judicial discretion to distinguish between degrees of
culpability for antitrust crimes.
The effectiveness of the guidelines in achieving uniformity and
deterrence necessarily depends on judicial acceptance of both the
deterrant purpose and the factors to be considered in imposing sen-
tences. The importance of avoiding wide disparity in sentences
should commend itself to the judiciary, both because disparity les-
sens deterrent impact and because, as a matter of simple justice,
similar defendants should receive similar punishments.9 3 The legis-
lative history of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act seems
persuasive that the goal of sentencing in antitrust cases is to deter
future violations. 4 As noted by the Alton court, Congress has pre-
empted the decision and has indicated that a court should regard
antitrust violations as serious crimes for which prison terms are
appropriate. 5
While agreement is less certain on the question of what factors
ought to be considered in aggravation or mitigation of sentences,
judicial rejection of one or more of the factors suggested by the Justice
Department96 need not undermine the basic deterrent strategy if the
18 month base sentence is implemented. The base sentence is crucial
to deterring future crimes in that it clearly indicates to potential
violators that upon conviction of an antitrust crime they will be se-
verely punished. 7
In opposition to the government's drive to secure prison terms for
antitrust violators, several groups that have systematically studied
sentencing procedures and alternatives have concluded that impris-
" The problem of sentencing disparity has received much attention in the various
proposals for reform of the general criminal sentencing process. See, e.g., 123 CONG.
REc. S405 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977); TASK FORCE, supra note 30, at 4-5 & 12; AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 49 & 60-61 (1967); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 17, at 223-24.
" See note 27 supra.
,5 United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,336 at
71,167 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Judge Parsons, who sentenced the Alton defendants, strongly
emphasized that he did not view deterrence as a goal of sentencing but only as an
acceptable byproduct. Interview with Chief Judge Parsons, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 806, AA-2, AA-7 (1977). The Supreme Court, however, has indicated
that, in its view, deterrence is an appropriate goal of sentencing. Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S., 817, 822 (1974).
11 A recently suggested list of aggravating and mitigating factors to apply to all
crimes, not just antitrust violations, is contained in TASK FORCE, supra note 30, at 44-
45.
'" See note 92 supra.
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onment has been used as a sanction far too frequently in criminal law
enforcement generally. 8 Most studies have concluded that, in the
average case, confinement is not the preferred remedy.9 However,
antitrust violations arguably are not average crimes and failure to
imprison antitrust criminals would unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the offense by perpetuating the belief that such crimes are merely
"technical violations."'' 10
Whether the deterrent strategy outlined by Congress and imple-
mented by the Justice Department guidelines will have the desired
effect of reducing antitrust crime is uncertain. Nevertheless, the
courts should be persuaded that Congress intended this deterrent
hypothesis to be tested by the imposition of more severe sanctions
upon antitrust violators. Indeed, one congressman has indicated that
if the courts do not sentence antitrust violators, and sentence them
severely, Congress will consider imposing a mandatory minimum
sentence for Sherman Act violations.' Hopefully, the courts will
heed this congressional directive and will impose more severe penal-
ties on antitrust criminals, thus avoiding the possibility of mandatory
minimum sentences that disadvantage the exceptional defendant
who, because of special circumstances, is deserving of lenient treat-
ment.
MARY KAY DEPoY
" See authorities cited note 44 supra.
I !d.
"0 See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
2.5(c) (1967); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (1962). The legisla-
tion introduced by Senator Kennedy also suggests that the sentencing judge should
consider whether a stiff sentence is required to avoid depreciating the seriousness of
the offense. See note 33 supra.
,01 Rep. Hutchinson stated:
Judges complain that we tie their hands whenever we write minimum
mandatory sentences into the law. Yet they leave little choice for
Congress when they treat serious wrongdoers leniently. We refrained
from imposing minimum mandatory sentences this time with the hope
that the courts would understand our firm resolve to crack down on
antitrust violators.
120 CONG. REc. H36340.
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